



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1904.

MORAL INSTRUCTION IN SCHOOLS.

There is probably no point on which there is such general agreement amongst those engaged in or interested in education as this: that children when they leave school (and in due measure whilst they are still at school) should be equipped to encounter the moral problems of life. The building up of character is recognised to be an even more important aim in education than is the cultivation of the mind or the development of the body. Does it follow from this that there ought to be moral instruction in schools?

I think we shall be able to discuss the question with more clearness of mind if we in the first place attempt to define to ourselves of what instruction in a given subject consists.

Clearly it presupposes a desire on the part of the instructor in some respect to modify or encourage the development of those instructed. It further implies that active steps are taken by the instructor to secure that the particular development desired shall come about.

To illustrate by an example: Instruction in physical culture implies that the instructor has in view the increase of the health and strength of the pupils' bodies and takes measures to bring this to pass.

But there may be a desire to influence the development of the young, and the teacher may take active steps to bring influence to bear in the desired direction, without its necessarily

following that he pursues his aim by means of *instruction*. He may simply try to secure that the conditions of life which surround his pupils shall be favorable to the end he has in view.

Thus a teacher bent on physical culture might encourage healthy games and out-door occupations; he might be careful as to school-room ventilation and heating, and he might see to it that the school furniture did not habitually either cramp or strain the body. Though this care for environment is not necessarily accompanied by instruction, it can scarcely be said that the converse statement holds good, for instruction can hardly be successfully undertaken if care is not exercised concurrently concerning environment. It is of little use giving children gymnastic exercises for an hour a week if they habitually live in close rooms.

Instruction itself, however, connotes something rather different from, though not necessarily more important than this care for surroundings. It involves a conscious direct relation between the teacher and his pupils, the latter being aware that the former is actively endeavoring to influence their development in some particular direction.

We may instance the difference between securing such healthful surroundings as have been enumerated above, and giving actual physical drill; or, again, the difference between, on the one hand, turning a squad of lads or girls into a gymnasium to amuse themselves, and on the other, directing all the proceedings in the gymnasium with an ordered purpose in view.

We have thus arrived at a conception of what instruction proper consists; but it is necessary that we should distinguish further between that part of it which is practical and the part that is theoretical. The first aims at accustoming the individual to the exercises that are considered beneficial, as when a child is given physical exercises. The second marks a departure from the position that up to this point we have assumed to be that of the teacher, viz., that of an autocrat. When the theory of a subject of study is taught the pupils are, as it were, taken into the confidence of the instructor and are told the *reasons* why certain chosen exercises and not others are imposed

on them, as when children are not only given physical exercises but are concurrently taught physiology, and shown how the exercises are based on physiological principles.

Now it is to be noticed concerning theoretical as distinguished from practical instruction that it is usually not substituted for it but superadded to it. As it places the pupil at the same view point as that occupied by the teacher, it paves the way for self-instruction and eventual independence of the latter. The admixture of theoretical with practical instruction is generally most wisely accomplished in very slight measure with young pupils, but in increasing degree as the pupils grow older, thus leading up to complete independence by the time that emancipation from teachers takes place. In many subjects it is *possible* for a child to finish his school career without receiving any theoretical instruction, but that theory should, in the measure that the mind is ripe for it, be brought in to reinforce practice is in general the mark of enlightened as distinguished from discredited methods of education.

In this attempt to analyse what the term "instruction" imports we perceive that there is a conception and, as it were, a reflection of that conception. The conception is in the teacher's mind, its reflection is its reproduction in the minds of his pupils. It follows that for instruction to be efficient the original conception should be definite and as far as possible consistent, otherwise we shall have a blurred and unsatisfactory result, as when a drill master sets his pupils an exercise that induces unhealthy fatigue.

I say consistent "as far as possible," for an educational curriculum seeks to develop various characteristics the full acquirement of some of which may not be compatible with the full acquirement of others. Here all we can demand is that the teacher's conception shall take cognizance of the inconsistency and that he shall define to himself the limits within which disadvantage in one direction shall be accepted in order to secure more important advantage in another.

We are now in a position to construct a sort of table shewing what are the essentials to a system of instruction in a given subject:

	Outline of Instruction.	Outline of Instruction more precisely stated.
The Conception.	The teacher desires to modify the development of his pupils in a given direction.	The teacher definitely realises to himself at what he aims in the development of his pupils in a certain direction, and exactly how far it is compatible with what he aims at in other directions, and where there is clashing how far each aim must give way.
The Reflection.	<p>He proceeds</p> <p>(a) to make the environment favorable to such modification.</p> <p>(b) to <i>instruct</i></p> <p>(1) practically,</p> <p>(2) theoretically.</p>	<p>(a) He arranges each surrounding circumstance in accordance with his carefully thought out conception.</p> <p>(b) (1) By examples which he sets before them and by inducing constant practice in themselves he induces in his pupils the <i>habit</i> of the exercise which he considers conducive to the development desired.</p> <p>(2) He secures his pupils as allies in his endeavor, by putting them in possession of the knowledge which has determined his own point of view.</p>

Having thus mapped out our subject as it applies generally, we can the better appreciate and the better criticise the attitude of mind assumed towards its particular application to the question with which we are concerned (*i. e.*, the giving of moral instruction in schools), characteristic of those different sections of the community who are most concerned in the matter.

Of these there are in England three principal types amongst those who have adopted definite convictions.

Those who consider that the problem is in the main to be met by giving dogmatic religious instruction. This is the Roman Catholic and the Anglican position.

Those who favor what is called "undenominational" religious teaching, the main feature of which is Bible lessons. This is what is called the "Protestant" position.

Those who oppose any association of supernaturalism with the teaching of morality, and yet consider it vital that moral instruction shall be imparted. The most important association for the furtherance of this policy is the Moral Instruction League.

But what does "the man in the street" say? The "men in the street" constitute a class of persons very little in evidence who, however, in reality vastly outnumber, I believe, the three classes enumerated above put together. This class is unlike the others in having no convictions that are felt to be completely satisfying as to how the problem is to be dealt with. The objections to the religious solutions offered by Roman Catholic, Churchman, or Nonconformist are half acknowledged. It is recognised that the mental development of children of tender age is not sufficiently advanced to grasp the dogmas laid down in the creeds. By some, too, it is acknowledged that the Bible, used as an inspired text book for moral teaching, exhibits inconsistencies which must sorely puzzle the child who is taught that he must treat with equal respect the code of morality laid down in the Old Testament, and that other and inconsistent code of morality which finds its expression in the Gospels. Nevertheless, the programme of the Moral Instruction League does not present to the people we now have in view a solution of the difficulty they are able to accept.

Now I am not self-confident enough to suppose that the argument contained in a paper of this kind is likely to affect the minds of those who are convinced that the particular form of religious instruction advocated by them includes in itself all moral instruction that is needful, that it does not exhibit inconsistencies between different parts of the moral system or between different parts of the religion inculcated, and, more-

over, that it supplies the only motives that will induce pupils to lead good lives

This, no doubt, is the attitude of the priesthood, of some of the Nonconformist ministers, and of those of the flocks of both who have most thoroughly adopted their teaching. But the bulk of the laity, whether they be Churchmen or Nonconformists (perhaps *not* if they be Roman Catholics), are in a different category. Accordingly I believe there does exist a large class of persons whose convictions as to what it is right to do in this matter are nebulous, although they recognise the importance of the issues involved; and it may not be altogether in vain to look at the matter through their spectacles in order to see whether it is possible to make any contribution to the solution of their difficulties. It will, therefore, possibly be worth while to endeavor to summarise the principal points of such persons' thoughts, or perhaps it would be better if we said reflections, on the matter, and subsequently examine these points from a critical and, if possible, from a constructive point of view.

In setting them forth it will be understood that I am not confining myself to the position taken up by any one individual, but rather that I am recalling the pleas commonly advanced that seem most typical of the frame of mind about which I am speaking, even though some of these pleas may be inconsistent with others.

Indeed, one distinguishes in this amorphous mass of opinion two opposed tendencies. All alike, it is true, are inclined to distrust denominational religious teaching for children as being unsuited to their immature intelligence; if the denominational dogmatism is extreme, distrust begins to border on resentment. But whilst journeying so far together divergence soon becomes apparent.

At one end of the scale we find people hardly distinguishable from those who accept the Protestant position except that in the depths of their minds they are, perhaps, not so absolutely certain as are their pastors that Bible lessons are the complete solution of the difficulty; but they say the Bible is "a good book," and Bible lessons can at all events do no

harm. On the whole, they view with favor "undenominational" teaching, even though it may be as dogmatic as that which is called "denominational."

From people who have half defined to themselves some such position as this, one passes by infinite gradations to those amongst whom the inclination is to consider any religious sanctions futile.

In practice these two schools of thought are not so far apart as might be supposed; for whilst on the one side we have faith in the Bible as a text book of morals, and therefore a desire that Scripture should be taught, we have on the other a readiness to maintain the necessity for Scripture lessons so that the Bible may at least be known "as literature." Moreover, the two schools of thought join hands in this. They are much alike in being doubtful whether any system of morals such as the Moral Instruction League advocates can be evolved which shall be simple enough systematically to be brought to bear on children. Even if such a system could be conceived by the philosophers, they do not believe that a faithful image of it will be found to exist in the minds of the various teachers; further, they are incredulous that such teachers as have themselves grasped the matter have the power to impart the conception to children.

The practical upshot of the whole matter is this. By some a certain amount of dissatisfaction with some of the available courses is felt; to others all possible courses are unsatisfactory; but to none does it seem worth while to depart very widely from the paths that are marked out as those that it is most easy to follow. If one of the number is a workingman, he will perhaps prefer to send his child to a "provided" rather than to a "non-provided" school; that is, if they are about equally conveniently situated; but if it is easier to enter his child at the sectarian school, having to send him there will not distress the father very much, and it is not likely that he will bestir himself to claim the protection of the Conscience Clause. If, on the other hand, he is a well-to-do parent the religious instruction given in the most public schools, and the "keeping of chapels," will not be expected to exercise a very baneful effect on

character, and some may even anticipate that it "will do the boy good."

The more "emancipated" will, however, tell you that in reality everything depends on *the tone of the school's being healthy*; children will then assimilate virtue through every pore of the moral nature as they imbibe pure air through their physical organs. Nor is it the emancipated alone who care about the "tone of the school." It is a matter of universal concern to careful parents. Everyone considers it a matter of the very greatest importance; the only difference is that whilst the emancipated parent thinks it the predominant, perhaps the only influence for good, others place it side by side with religious influences.

Here, then, apparently, we have a point of agreement between almost all parents. What is meant by the "tone" of a school, therefore, is clearly worth careful examination. An understanding of it may even prove to be a key to many of our difficulties.

Like all vague phrases this conception of the tone of a school carries with it a fringe of meaning of differing import as it is used by different persons. To one it will be inherent in it that provincialisms of speech are eradicated; to another, that the children are the offspring of those who work in offices and are engaged in "commerce," rather than of those who "trade" in shops; to yet another, that there shall be no connection either with commerce or trade, that one of the pupils shall be the son of an Earl or a Bishop, and so forth, and so forth. Of many of these things it may be said that they are trivial, of all it is safe to say that they do not form part of the *essential* idea that engages most people's minds in this connection.

The essential, one might almost say the universally accepted idea that the phrase imports is that a *moral ideal* is set before the school.

But does this help us very much? Does the fact that a moral ideal is an almost universal demand of parents give promise of unity of purpose? Is it not possible that there is infinite diversity of moral aim? Well, when one considers that some children are brought up to be grasping, others to

be chivalrous; some to be modest, others self-assertive; some to be sensitive, others to be comparatively indifferent to physical or to moral pain; some to be independent, others the reverse of independent, and so forth, one is almost inclined reluctantly to answer, "Yes, it is true, the hope of finding a common platform here is a vain one."

But let us turn a moment from people's actions to their professions. Here, I think, we shall find a considerable and very important common factor, and, strange as the doctrine may seem, there is very good reason for preferring in this matter people's words to their deeds. Their professions are at the high-water mark of their ideals. Those who profess them are not ashamed to defend their position to their fellow-men, and their fellow-men are justified in holding them to what they thus profess.

Now, I think it is quite possible to set forth a moral ideal which will command general adhesion of this kind. Few people would object to the teaching of the Church Catechism if the instruction given were confined to giving in its own form two scriptural injunctions, in the *Question*, "What is thy duty towards thy neighbor?" and in part of the *Answer*, which replies to it, "My duty towards my neighbor is to love him as myself, and to do to all men as I would that they should do unto me." If this were put forward as the governing conception in the moral up-bringing of the young it would almost universally command nominal allegiance at least. It would be admitted that the conception here expressed is the kernel of the matter. As a basis of morals, however, it is pretty clear that it is incomplete, without a realization of what it carries with it; for it serves to mark for us what we shall strive to do, but it takes no security that we shall be able to accomplish it. What the welfare of others requires from us cannot be effected by a weakling in mind, body, or character, so that whilst unselfishness is enjoined, self-development is necessarily implied.

I do not suggest that to be capable of fulfilling the service we are called upon to perform for others is the only justification of self-development. That was the doctrine of James Hinton, and as presented by him it is felt to be a noble and inspiring

theory of life. But after all the "natural man" has his claims. Except to the most elevated characters there will be a sense of unreality in referring every action to the good of others; for to most people it appears that each individual has claim to some share in the "joy of living" for himself. The extreme of self-abnegation would be especially difficult to make a vital doctrine to children in a healthy way. Our Biblical text does not suggest the complete renunciation of self-love, but only that it should not grow at the expense of love towards our neighbors, or be allowed to clash with it.

The duty of self-development can, no doubt, be taught effectively on the basis of self-love alone; it can, for example, be shown that the cultivated man will in his self-contained life be happier than the ignoramus will be in his. But though this is a part of the case for self-development that should be duly presented, it may easily be over-emphasised. At any rate, it is important concurrently with the necessity of self-development in individual life, to insist on its necessity for the due performance of our part as members of an organised society. If we are to recognise the call of the service of others we must be capable of that service and must maintain a dignified standard for ourselves no less than for others. As Locke says, we are "not to think meanly of ourselves, and not to think meanly of others." All this I take to be implied in the great conception of the Brotherhood of Man, which, perhaps, in one phrase summarises almost all we mean. Yet not completely, for we must admit into some share of comradeship those creatures which are below man. The ideal of the ordinary British person will hardly be satisfied unless some account is taken of the interests of the animals.

I have said I do not think that we shall encounter any widespread opposition to the proposition that in a school, the tone of which is good, the moral ideals of which I have spoken are fostered. If this be granted, referring for a moment to the table where I have attempted to map out the conception of what "Instruction" involves, it will be perceived that the teacher desires to modify the development of his pupils in a given direction, and we now see that though it is questioned whether he

can do so profitably by direct instruction, he is permitted, nay, he is required to contrive that the mental surroundings in his school, the "atmosphere," as it has been called, shall be favorable to these particular modifications of development. We have seen that efficiently to accomplish this, quite as necessarily as if he were engaged in direct instruction, he must define to himself with absolute definiteness, and we may add with some elaboration of detail, precisely what it is that he wishes to bring about, and precisely how compatible this aim may be with other educational aims that he sets before himself. It is equally essential for the conception to be distinct whether the reflection is to be secured by indirect means or by actual instruction.

For example, the teacher may find a difficulty in reconciling the teaching of goodwill towards man with the justification of wars undertaken in the search for "glory" or for the furtherance of military ascendancy. But, how, then, is he to proceed to produce his environment favorable to the cultivation of the idea of goodwill towards man? He may, it is true, make the first idea familiar to the minds of his pupils by the use of biography, story, and history; but in the ordinary course of events the other set of ideas which clashes with it will also be rendered familiar in a similar way. As neither can flourish except at the expense of the other, the teacher must plainly settle with himself how far he desires that the one should override the other. Suppose him to have determined to his own satisfaction that the feeling of goodwill towards man is one to be fostered, even though it clash with what may be predominate national feeling, how then must he proceed? Something, no doubt, can be done by selection and elimination. When, for example, he chooses pictures for the adornment of his school-room walls, he may avoid battle pieces even though they record the victories of Wellington or of Nelson.¹

¹ M. Payot, Inspector of Public Instruction of the Marne, issued in 1902 a circular containing the following passages: "I request the teachers to see to the removal from the walls of the school of all pictures representing scenes of violence. In one school I counted in fifteen engravings fourteen that gave beheadings, tortures, massacres, and

But to rely altogether on selection and elimination is to attempt to bring up children without knowledge that evil exists in the world, an impossible task, and one that, even were it accomplished, would have furnished forth the child with but incomplete moral protection when the time came for him to go out into the world.

But if we are to set evil things as well as good things before the young we shall not be fulfilling what we have laid down as our purpose, if we do not aid them to discriminate the one from the other. The teacher must become commentator and point out what things are good and what evil.

But here the reader will pause to wonder where this argument is going to land us. For have we not by a process of reasoning from which there seems to be no logical escape, arrived at that dreaded result at which we are accustomed to look so much askance—full-fledged moral instruction not necessarily associated with religious instruction?

It is true that the particular form of words that I have quoted as indicating the basis of this moral system is Biblical. But if we define religion as including a belief in doctrines that are supernatural the text is not *religious*, but merely *ethical*. The idea might be expressed almost as well in a formula of words which will be admitted to be quite secular and non-religious, "Do as you would be done by." It is, therefore, at least conceivable that this common ethical platform may be used as the basis for moral instruction dissociated from religious instruction.

I shall defer the discussion of whether such dissociation would add to or take from its completeness and efficiency till a later part of this paper. But meanwhile we appear to have arrived at this result that whether in combination with religious instruction or not, direct moral or ethical instruction is the

treacherous murders. We should be careful not to familiarise children with sights of violence and ferocity. The brutal instincts of the human race are not yet sufficiently weakened or crowded out by higher ones to admit of our placing before the eyes of the young scenes of murder and other atrocities."

logical outcome of the demand of the parents that the tone of the school shall be good.

I can imagine an interlocutor replying, "Not quite. I admit the propriety, even the obligation that lies on a teacher to take advantage of opportunities that present themselves to point the moral in connection with the teaching of other subjects or in connection with incidents that may naturally arise. That is a different thing from sitting down in cold blood, as it were, deliberately to give moral instruction in an hour's set lesson." Well, yes, of course it is a different thing so far as machinery is concerned, but so far as the conception of the teacher's duty is concerned, so far as are concerned the relations between him and his pupils, there seems to me to be no valid distinction. By anyone taking up this position the necessity for moral instruction is admitted; it only remains to be decided how such moral instruction can best be administered, whether in connection with other subjects of instruction (or it may be in comment on events of school life as they arise) only, or in addition by lessons expressly devoted thereto. Those who conclude against direct instruction exclusively devoted to moral subjects, will, it seems to me, do so more from the point of view of what is convenient and effective in teaching, than because they consider that such teaching is opposed to any of the principles they are following out. There are, for instance, few teachers who would not show disapprobation of untruthfulness. Their moral instruction in this particular is not only direct and exclusively devoted to the subject in point, but is often of a very emphatic character.

Surely, however, the presumption is that a subject admitted to be of the first importance cannot even on its practical side be satisfactorily imparted, it is certain that it cannot be on its theoretical side, if it is, as it were, only taught in asides in connection with what may otherwise transpire. It will be the second, not the first consideration, and it is impossible to convey the conception of a moral system as a whole, so that the importance of each part in relation to each other part shall be properly appreciated, in any such scrappy way.

The code of conduct which will grow up amongst children subjected to such nurture will be but a distorted reflection of the original conception in the teacher's mind. In most instances it will cease to be a moral code and become what is called a "code of honor." Now the characteristics of a code of honor are, firstly, that it has hardly any measure of comparative moral value; what it characterises as delinquencies are reprobated with equal severity whether they involve a vital or an immaterial departure from virtue, or no departure from virtue at all; secondly, that its sympathies are apt to be narrow; the brotherhood it recognises does not embrace mankind, but rather pits a small fellowship against the rest of the world; and, thirdly, the virtues as well as the follies and, in some instances, the vices that in inculcates tend to become stereotyped. As a system it is not corrected and refreshed by continual comparison with a rational moral code. Its authority is as unquestioned, its maxims as inflexible as those of a dogmatic religion resting on authority, and in the one case as in the other what is inculcated does not adjust itself to the varying requirements of the problems that arise amongst living humanity. It is not imbued with vitality and is, therefore, unsuited to be the guide of living beings. A code of honor, like a stereotyped religious system, certainly gives some security that the good that has already been recognised as essential shall be guarded and practised, but both alike are obstacles in the way of an advance to a higher ethical standard.

I have spoken of the disproportionate value which the boy or girl often puts on one set of qualities which, when measured by the moral standard that ought to be set up, are trivial. It would not be impossible, I think, to find instances of virtues that are actually regarded as vices, of vices looked upon as virtues. I cannot think that this want of scale, so to speak, in moral perception is likely to be corrected by the casual moral instruction that is, as it were, "thrown in" with the history lesson, the literature lesson, or what not. It seems to me to demand a well-thought-out, well-ordered, systematic course of instruction, conscious precisely at what it aims and calculated exactly to bring the result about.

The other two characteristics of the code of honor that I have noted, namely: its tendency to foster the fellowship of a coterie rather than a citizenship of the world, and its persistency in conceptions that are often trivial and sometimes worse than trivial, because of its divorce from a rational source of inspiration, both point strongly, in my opinion, to a need for direct moral instruction; nay, more, they point to the necessity of our proceeding a considerable distance along that path, to our teaching not only what I have called the practical side of the subject, but its theoretical side also. Except with very young children, it seems to me that confidence that precept will bring about obedience, and reliance solely on the inculcation of the *habit* of doing what is right, must certainly be reinforced by an appeal to the reasoning powers; for the learners will inevitably begin to question *why* their teachers consider such and such things right and such and such other things wrong. If they are to be made to see eye to eye with their teachers in these matters, the reasons must be brought home to them of *why* they should reject that which is evil and cleave to that which is good.

I have now advanced so far in my subject that it may be possible for me to sketch out what I think might be the substance of a course of moral instruction actually applicable to children, and in doing so I will try faithfully to adhere to the map of abstract instruction and what it involves that we previously constructed.

It will be remembered that it divided itself into the definite conception in the teacher's mind of the development which he wished to bring about in his pupils' characters, and the *Reflection* of that conception in the pupils' minds brought about (a) by making the surrounding circumstances favorable to its growth, and (b) by direct instruction.

Now when I placed environment (a), and definite instruction (b), in that order, it did not imply that in practice (a) would precede (b). It will be remembered that my hope of the acceptability of a system of moral instruction is based on the general concurrence of those concerned, and that concurrence is at present more consciously accorded to environment

than it is to direct instruction; hence my order of enumeration. But now that we are considering the practical applicability of any such system we do not find it necessary to give precedence either to environment or to definite instruction. They will be brought into action *concurrently*, each supporting and reinforcing the other. For the purpose of exposition it will be convenient to consider (b) before (a), because (b) sets out definitely what (a) is as far as possible to conform to.

When, on the other hand, we consider the subdivisions of definite instruction (b), the arrangement into (1) practical and (2) theoretical *does* mark a precedence of the one over the other, for children of tender age are not yet ripe for theoretical work. We shall find that the age-grouping of children for this subject will have to recognise these two stages of instruction, and further that they will have to be supplemented by a third.

The first stage then will be practical instruction, taking account of simple problems of conduct only, *i. e.*, those problems where the conflict of motive is between unmixed good and unmixed evil. The second will traverse the same ground theoretically as well as practically. And the third will give theoretical as well as practical instruction not only in simple problems of conduct but in those complex ones where there is a mixture of, or actual conflict between motives, each of which is in itself commendable.

How then can we shortly describe the conception which is to be figured forth in the teacher's mind? It is that human beings are not an agglomeration of isolated units each fighting for his own hand, but that each is a part of a great human society and that each has definite duties and obligations towards the rest of society. Each, too, derives extraordinary benefit from his membership of this society, and if he live up to his privileges may enjoy the confidence and esteem of many, and from a smaller circle personal affection. The reverse of this is a state of isolation; so far as man can bring this about for his fellow-men, it is exemplified by the terrible punishment of solitary confinement.

A complete fulfillment of human fellowship kindles the sym-

pathies to so bright a glow that it is impossible to confine their scope to human beings alone. A man can hardly be sensitively sympathetic to all around him including the most degraded as well as the noblest of mankind and yet delight in cruelty to animals.² (Apparent instances may perhaps be adduced to the contrary, as of the Spaniard, admirable in all other relations of life, who frequents bull fights, or of the seventeenth century benevolent Englishman who kept fighting cocks. In such cases it is hardly the cruelty that is enjoyed, but some other appeal to the human emotions so engrossing as effectually to enable men to blind themselves to the cruelty involved.)

Human society, then, rests on a system of mutual aid, the incalculable benefits of which it is our privilege to receive but no less our duty to give forth: benefits, indeed, which we cannot receive in the fullest and highest degree unless we also give forth.

The individual's part in life may be compared to that of a cog on a tiny wheel in some vast maze of machinery; compared—but with this difference, that whereas any failure on the part of any portion of the minute wheel may dislocate and bring to ruin the whole fabric of the machine, the failure of the individual in human society will not bring disaster on the whole world, but only wreak mischief of a more limited kind. That mischief *will* be wrought is, however, as certain in the one case as in the other; the difference is that we are not utterly but only in some measure dependent on each of the human units with which we come into contact, and that conversely we cannot utterly either make or mar the lives of those around us, but can only do so in some measure.

It thus appears that every man has his part to play in the great drama, and it follows that he must be equipped for the fray. And so all those qualities which make men strong to help forward what is good in the world are shown to have their purpose as certainly as it can be shown that the cog-wheel

² We have crystallized this idea in our extended use of the word "*humanity*" which includes in common parlance the disposition to treat with tenderness those orders of animals which are below man in the scale of life.

must be strong, durable, accurately cut, or running without friction.

Thus the way is opened for definite lessons on such subjects as sympathy, and the hatefulness of cruelty; individual friendship; self-respect and self-reliance; self-control and temperance in all things; justice; the necessity of work; truthfulness; the cultivation of the intelligence; the cultivation of the imagination, and of a true and not a false sense of humor; courage, moral as well as physical; courtesy and good manners, and many others.

Of all such qualities that which we must account the most fundamental is that which I have mentioned first, Sympathy; for Sympathy transfers to the breast of the individual that which without it exists only outside him; and as it is that on which the weal of the community depends, it is necessary that it shall be thus felt by the individual before it can become the motive force on which we count to regulate his conduct. Sympathy if complete is a sufficient guarantee of faithfulness in each to what is required for the common good; for a departure from such faithfulness means the infliction somewhere or other in the human society of injury, and sympathy means the participating in the penalties of such injury by the person (amongst others) who may be tempted to such departure from faithfulness. It therefore provides the direct motive to fidelity of life.

And if Sympathy is the foundation of a well-knit human society, Truthfulness is the quality which perhaps constitutes the most important piece of machinery by which the community of interest between each and all is emphasised. If we all lead completely isolated lives there would really be no necessity for Truth; and the high place accorded to Truthfulness amongst the virtues is the half-unconscious tribute paid to the paramount of the conception of the solidarity of mankind.

HERBERT M. THOMPSON.

LLANDAFF, CARDIFF.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]